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A HOUSE DIVIDED: EARL CALDWELL, THE NEW YORKTIMES, 
AND THE QUEST FOR A TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE 
Eric B. Easton' 
1. INTRODUCTION 
With a Democrat in the White House and strong Democratic majorities in 
both the House and Senate, proponents of a federal "shield law" for reporters are 
hopeful that the 111 th Congress will finally do what earlier Congresses have failed 
to accomplish: enact a statutory testimonial privilege to enable journalists to 
protect their confidential sources. I Until it does, however, federal prosecutors will 
be permitted to subpoena members of the working press to appear before grand 
juries and other tribunals and force them to identify all manner of whistleblowers, 
ax-grinders, traitors, patriots, and garden-variety leakers. Once again, journalists 
will argue they have a First Amendment right to protect their sources as essential 
to gathering the news. And once again, the argument will probably fail. 
In the 1972 case of Branzburg v. Hayes,2 the Supreme Court held the First 
Amendment does not protect journalists who refuse to reveal their confidential 
sources or news gathering product in response to a federal grand jury subpoena.3 
That decision has remained vital for thirty-five years and has reverberated through 
a number of recent high-profile cases.4 Despite some form of protection in nearly 
• © 2009 Eric B. Easton, Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; 
J.D., University of Maryland School of Law (l989); Ph.D.' Candidate, Philip Merrill 
College of Journalism, University of Maryland College Park; B.S., Medill School of 
Journalism, Northwestern University (1968). I wish to thank Earl Caldwell, who graciously 
consented to be interviewed for this project, and my dedicated research assistant, Hae-In 
Lee, for his help in collecting the many documents necessary to complete it. 
1 The U.S. House of Representatives passed the Free Flow of Information Act of 
2009, H.R. 985, by voice vote on March 31, 2009. See Samantha Fredrickson, House 
Passes Federal Shield Bill, News Media Update (Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press), March 31, 2009, http://www.rcfp.orginewsitems/index.php?i=10682. The U.S. 
Senate Judiciary Committee reported its own shield law, S. 448, on Dec. 10, 2009. See 
Cristina Abello, Federal Shield Bill Passes Senate JudiCiary Committee, News Media 
Update (Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press), Dec. 10, 2009, 
http://www.rcfp.org/newsitems/index.php?i=11167.Anidentical "shield law" passed the 
House in the 1l0th Congress by a vote of 398-21; a similar bill was approved by the 
Senate Judiciary Committee but died at the end of the l10th Congress. Id. 
2 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
3 /d. at 667. 
4 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Wolfv. United States, 201 F. App'x 430, 432 
(9th Cir. 2006); New York Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 172-74 (2d Cir. 2006); 
Wen Ho Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 413 F.3d 53, 57-61 (D.C. Cir. 2005); In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena, Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 968-81 (D.C. Cir. 2005); In re Special Proceedings, 373 
F.3d 37, 44--45 (lst Cir. 2004); McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 531-33 (7th Cir. 
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every state court,5 reporters haled before a federal judge may have no. recourse 
save prison. 
Devastating as Branzburg has been for the so-called "journalist's privilege," 
its negative impact has been far broader. Branzburg is one of the Supreme Court's 
earliest newsgathering decisions and arguably the most influentia1.6 Although the 
press has been successful in persuading the courts to find First Amendment 
protection for its editorial product, it has been far less successful with regard to 
protection for newsgathering.7 The Branzburg precedent epitomiz~s the frustration 
of the press in attempting to secure First Amendment, or even statutory, protection 
for newsgathering, and this Article explores one of the primary reasons for that 
failure: the inability of the diverse elements that constitute "the press" to agree on 
the appropriate scope of such protection. 
The legislative debates between media organizations advocating an absolute 
privilege and those seeking only a qualified privilege have been widely reported. 8 
Far less well known are the conflicts among the various media personalities and 
organizations that participated in the Branzburg litigation. These conflicts, this 
Article submits, are at least partly responsible for the Branzburg precedent, which 
effectively foreclosed the possibility of an expansive First Amendment privilege 
for newsgathering. 
This Article examines the Branzburg case as an example of strategic litigation 
initiated or pursued by mainstream media organizations as part of a continuing 
effort to shape the First Amendment doctrine under which journalists practice their 
craft. Part II presents the factual background of the three cases that were 
consolidated in the Branzburg opinion, as well as brief procedural timelines and 
synopses of the opinions in the cases. This Article focuses throughout on what is 
by far the most important of the three-Caldwell v. United States.9 Part III 
examines more closely the values of the reporters and editors who decided to take 
these cases all the way to the United States Supreme Court through the arguments 
that were presented on their behalf. Part IV assesses the benefits of success, the 
costs of failure, and the probability of either outcome as they might have been 
2003); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Fainaru-Wada, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1115-18 (N.D. 
Cal. 2006); United States v. Libby, 432 F. Supp. 2d 26, 43-48 (D.D.C. 2006). 
5 Complete information on state shield laws is available at The Reporters Committee 
for Freedom of the Press Web site, Privilege Compendium page, http:// 
www.rcfP·orgiprivilege/. 
6 Only Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539-40 (1965), is earlier, and a quick 
LexisNexis search shows that courts claimed to follow Branzburg five times (107-21) as 
often as Estes. 
7 See Eric B. Easton, The Press as an Interest Group: Mainstream Media in the 
United States Supreme Court, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 247,255 (2007) (finding that of the 
seventy content regulation cases decided by the Court, the press won forty-three and lost 
twenty-seven; in the twenty-four newsgathering cases, the press won only six and lost 
eighteen). 
8 See infra Part V.B. 
9 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970). 
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calculated by the parties at the time. Part V looks at the opinion itself and the 
equally unavailing legislative efforts that followed. Finally, the Article offers 
tentative conclusions about the miscalculations that left the press with such a 
disastrous precedent on the books. 
This is not an extended case note on Branzburg or a contemplation of the 
journalist's privilege, shield laws, and the like. Much has already been written 
along those lines. JO Rather, this is part of the author's continuing study of the press 
as a political institution attempting to exercise its influence through the litigation 
process. 
More important, this Article features the first-person account of Earl 
Caldwell, the New York Times reporter whose coverage of the Black Panther 
movement and heroic refusal to testify about his news sources before a federal 
grand jury brought this issue to the Court's attention. I 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Caldwell Case 
Earl Caldwell was born in Clearfield, Pennsylvania, and attended the 
University of Buffalo as a business major until, as an African-American, he 
became disillusioned by racism in the insurance industry.ll On returning to 
Clearfield, Caldwell landed a job at the local newspaper, The Progress, where he 
became a sports editor. 12 From there, he moved on to the Lancaster Intelligencer-
Journal, and then to the Rochester, N.Y., Democrat and Chronicle, where he first 
began writing on racial issues. 13 In 1965, he began reporting for the New York 
Herald Tribune, moving briefly to the New York Post when the Herald Tribune 
closed. He joined The New York Times in 1967. 14 
Caldwell was one of a number of black reporters hired in the mid- and late 
1960s by the· mainstream press to cover race relations, particularly the urban 
10 See Rex S. Heinke & Galit Avitan, Reconciling Branzburg and Daily Mail: A 
Proposalfor a Qualified Reporters' Privilege, 32 OHIO N.V. L. REv. 503, 503-07 (2006); 
Leila Wombacher Knox, Note, The Reporter's Privilege: The Necessity of a Federal Shield 
Law Thirty Years After Branzburg, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 125, 137-44 (2006); 
Kristina Spiruieweber, Comment, Branzburg, Who? The Existence of a Reporter's 
Privilege in Federal Courts, 44 DUQ. L. REv. 317,318-22 (2006). 
. II Biographical information on Earl Caldwell comes from the Robert C. Maynard 
Institute for Journalism Education, where Caldwell is a founding director. Earl Caldwell 
Biography, http://www.mije.orgihistoryproject/Biography-EarICaldwell (last visited Dec. 
I, 2009). Additional information comes from the author's interview with Earl Caldwell. 
See Interview with Earl Caldwell in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 11,2009) [hereinafter Caldwell 
Interview] (notes on file with author). 
12 Earl Caldwell Biography, supra note II. 
13 I d. 
14 I d. 
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rioting that was largely inaccessible to white reporters. 15 Gene Roberts points out 
that, until then, only a handful of black reporters worked on white dailies-thirty-
one in 1955, according to Ebony magazine. 16 Caldwell recalls that the new influx 
of black reporters, who were hired to cover not only the riots but also the dramatic 
changes occurring in the black community, led to the formation of the New York 
Association of Black Journalists, which played a critical part in his story.17 
In the fall of 1968, the Times assigned Caldwell to cover the Black Panther 
Party in the San Francisco Bay area, and he developed a confidential relationship 
with the Panthers that enabled him to write stories "that no one else in the country 
could have written.,,18 Caldwell's stories from that time evince his access to 
Panther headquarters and personalities that could not help but attract official 
attention. One provided the following description: 
In the back room of an apartment deep in the Fillmore slum a 
bearded youth in an Afro hair style uncovered a stack of rifles that was 
only partly hidden in a dark comer. . 
He said nothing but began wrapping the weapons in robes and old 
blankets, preparing to transport them to Oakland, where [Huey] Newton 
has been jailed for nearly a year. 
Some were high-powered lever action rifles. Others appeared to be 
automatic weapons. 
"The verdict [in the Newton trial] is irrelevant," the youth said. 
"The sky is the limit.,,19 
Yet another story related the following details: 
It is well past midnight and .quiet out on Shattuck Avenue. The liquor 
store on the comer is empty , and the lights are already out in the 
barbeque shop next door. 
But up in the middle of the block, up there in the two-story 
brownstone that the Black Panther party occupies, a dash of yellow light 
slips through an upstairs window. 
They are still there, up there in those cluttered, noisy rooms behind 
windows covered with huge steel plates and walls lined with bulging, 
dusty sandbags?O 
IS See GENE ROBERTS & HANK KLIBANOFF, THE RACE BEAT: THE PRESS, THE CIVIL 
RiGHTS STRUGGLE, AND THE AWAKENING OF A NATION 396 (2006). 
16Id. at 365. 
17 Caldwell Interview, supra note 11. 
18 MAURICE VAN GERPEN, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION AND THE PRESS 37 (1979). 
19 Earl Caldwell, Angry Panthers Talk of War and Unwrap Weapons, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 10, 1968, at 30. 
20 Earl Caldwell, 'Declining Black Panthers Gather New Support from Repeated 
Clashes with Police, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1969, at 64. 
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In late 1969, the FBI began calling Caldwell every day, asking him to spy on 
his sources. Caldwell refused to cooperate, and, on the advice of bureau chief 
Wallace Turner, eventually stopped answering the telephone.21 "They were 
hounding me for over a month," according to Caldwell, who said that FBI callers 
warned the office manager: "'You tell him this is not a game. We're not playing 
with him. He don't want to talk to us? He can tell it in court. ",22 
When a federal marshal initially came to the Times bureau with a subpoena, 
Caldwell was OUt.23 Turner urged him to destroy his files and then do some 
reporting from Alaska until it all blew over.24 Caldwell did destroy most of the 
files, which he had been saving to write a book and included information on 
Panthers he had not written about in the newspapers. ("Panthers I keep in my 
pocket," he called them.)25 But once the material was destroyed, he "didn't have it 
in [his] heart" to go to Alaska.26 
On February 2, 1970, Caldwell was served with a subpoena duces tecum 
ordering him to appear before a federal grand jury in the Northern District of 
California.27 He was told to bring his notes and recorded interviews with the 
Panther leadership and to testify as to the purposes and activities of the Party?8 
Caldwell believes the FBI broke into the Times bureau or tapped its telephones, or 
both, because some of the Panthers named in the subpoena had been "in his 
pocket" and never written about.29 In any event, he objected to the scope of the 
subpoena, and his scheduled appearance was postponed.30 On March 16, however, 
he received a second subpoena, without the requirement that he produce 
documents.31 Caldwell and the Times moved to quash on the ground that requiring 
Caldwell to testify before the grand jury would "suppress vital constitutional 
interests. ,,32 
Caldwell was supported by a number of affidavits from New York Times and 
Newsweek reporters, as well as an amicus curiae brief from CBS News, with 
21 Caldwell Interview, supra note 11. 
22 Jd.; see also VAN GERPEN, supra note 18, at 37-38. 




27 Motion to Quash Grand Jury Subpoenas, in Sup. Ct. App. of Records and Briefs for 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) [hereinafter Branzburg App.], Caldwell v. 
United States, 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (No. 70-57), at 4. 
28 !d. 
29 Caldwell Interview, supra note II. . 
30 Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1083 n.2 (9th Cir. 1970). 
31 Subpoena to Testify Before the Grand Jury, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, 
Caldwell, 402 U.S. 942 (No. 70-57), at 4,21. 
32 Motion to Q~ash Grand Jury Subpoenas, supra note 27, at 4. James Goodale, then 
General Counsel of The New York Times Co., says the Times intervened as owner of the 
work product of its reporter. See James C. Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the 
Developing Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709, 735 (1975). 
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affidavits from its leading correspondents;33 the government filed three memoranda 
in opposition to the motion to quash, each supported by affidavits.34 
Behind the scenes, however, all was not harmonious. According to Caldwell, 
the Times initially hired the San Francisco law firm Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro to 
defend him.35 According to Caldwell, when he met with John Bates, the attorney 
assigned to his case, Bates told him, "We've got a tremendous problem with law 
and order out here . . . probably some of your material should be given to the 
FBI.,,36 Bates told Caldwell to bring all his material to the office and to meet with 
Times Company Executive Vice President Harding Bancroft, who was flying out 
to oversee the case, so they could decide what should be turned over. 37 
Determined to find his own lawyer, Caldwell sought help from the New York 
Association of Black Joumalists.38 That connection led him to the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund (LDF), which found the perfect lawyer for the case?9 Anthony G. 
Amsterdam had handled a number of death penalty cases for LDF40 and, in 1969, 
had helped in the appeal of Black Panther Bobby Seale.41 He was teaching at 
Stanford Law School at the time ~md agreed to hear Caldwell's story.42 
33 Affidavits Attached to Motion to Quash, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, 
Caldwell, 402 U.S. 942 (No. 70-57), at 9-61. 
34 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena, in 
Branzburg App., supra note 27, Caldwell, 402 U.S. 942 (No. 70-57), at 62-79 (includes 
two supplemental memoranda). 
35 Caldwell Interview, supra note II. 
36Id. Publicly, the Times editorialized against the subpoenas, but its support for 
Caldwell was equivocal: 
People whose jobs, associations, or reputations are at stake cannot be 
expected to speak freely on an off-the-record basis if they have reason to fear 
that both their identity and the totality of their remarks will be turned over to the 
police. 
The attendant and even more serious danger is that the entire process will 
create the impression that the press operates as an investigative agency for 
government rather than as an independent force dedicated to the unfettered flow 
of information to the public .... 
This newspaper and all the mass media have the same duties as other 
organizations or individuals to cooperate in the processes of justice. But neither 
justice nor democracy will benefit if the subpoena power is misused to abridge 
the independence and effectiveness of the press. 
Subpoenas on the Press, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 4, 1970, at 42. 
37 Caldwell Interview, supra note 11. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id.; see also Nadya Labi, A Man Against the Machine, THE LAW SCHOOL: THE 
MAGAZINE OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Autumn 2007, at 12. 
41 Labi, supra note 40, at 15. 
42 Caldwell Interview, supra note 11. 
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Caldwell was initially reluctant to talk with another white lawyer, but because 
he had nowhere else to turn, he called Amsterdam about midnight and drove to his 
home in Los Altos.43 When Amsterdam told Caldwell he had a "legal right to 
refuse" to testify, Caldwell was thrilled. 44 Amsterdam took the case pro bono, and 
he, not Caldwell, attended the strategy meeting with Bancroft the next day.45 When 
Caldwell arrived some hours later,. Bancroft indicated he was delighted with 
Amsterdam and wanted to hire him, but Amsterdam refused to accept money from 
the paper.46 
On April 6, the district court denied the motion to quash but issued a 
protective order limiting the scope of Caldwell's testimony to information given to 
him for publication.47 The court also stayed the effective date of its order pending 
appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,48 but the appeal was 
dismissed, "apparently on the ground that the District Court order was not 
appealable. ,,49 
Caldwell received yet a third subpoena on May 22, 1970, and the district court 
again ordered attendance under the protective order. 50 Fearing for his personal 
safety, he refused to appear before the grand jury in secret.51 The district court 
found Caldwell in contempt, and he again appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 52 
According to Caldwell, the' Times Company was furious at the appeal. 53 The 
company ordered him back to New York to discuss the matter with General 
Counsel James Goodale.54 Caldwell remembers Goodale shaking his finger in front 
of Caldwell's face, saying, "If you keep pushing this, you're going to get a bad law 
written.,,55 Goodale's prediction would ultimately come true, but not in the Ninth 
Circuit. Caldwell, who did not attend the argument, said Amsterdam convinced the 
court that ruining Caldwell's career and risking his life was too high a price for a 





47 In re Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358,360 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (mem.). 
48 Id. at 362. 
49 Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1083 n.2. 
50 Id. 
51 Caldwell Interview, supra note 11. 
52 Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1083 n.2. 
53 Caldwell Interview, supra note 11. 
54 !d. 
55 !d. 
56 Id. Goodale says "one of the reasons that Amsterdam decided to appeal the 
appearance issue after winning a qualified privilege in the district court was an 
apprehension that the government might possibly penetrate the privilege proposed there by 
Caldwell in some unknown respect, forcing testimony, albeit of an extremely limited 
nature, from Caldwell." Goodale, supra note 32, at 719 n.47 (citing personal 
correspondence from Amsterdam). 
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The Ninth Circuit reversed on November 16, 1970, ordering the contempt 
judgment vacated and holding that "where it has been shown that the public's First 
Amendment right to be informed would be jeopardized by requiring a journalist to 
submit to secret Grand Jury interrogation, the Government must respond by 
demonstrating a compelling need for the witness's presence before [the] judicial 
process properly can issue to require attendance.,,57 The United States petitioned 
for certiorari, which was granted on May 3, 1971, along with petitions from Paul 
Branzburg and Paul Pappas, whose cases are discussed below.58 
B. The Branzburg Case 
In 1969, Pau~ Branzburg was ~ twenty-seven-year-old reporter for the 
Louisville Courier-Journal, where he served as a member of a special assignment 
group doing investigative journalism.59 Branzburg had received an A.B. from 
Cornell University in 1963, a J.D. from Harvard Law School in 1966, and an M.S. 
cum laude from Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism in 1967.60 
"His investigative work on the use of narcotics and other issues had been 
recognized on numerous occasions, and he was nominated twice for the Pulitzer 
Prize based on stories dealing with drugs and agricultural subsidies.61 
On November 15, 1969, the Courier-Journal carried a story by Branzburg 
describing his observations of two Louisville "hippies" synthesizing hashish from 
marijuana in a makeshift lab.62 Branzburg wrote: '''I don't know why I'm letting 
you do this story,' [Larry] said quietly. 'To make the narcs (narcotics detectives) 
mad, I guess. That's the main reason.' However, Larry and his partner asked for 
and received a promise that their names would be changed.,,63 The article also 
included a photograph of hands working with hashish.64 
Branzburg was subpoenaed shortly thereafter by the Jefferson County grand 
jury. He appeared, but declined to identify the "Larry" and "Jack" of his story.65 
57 Caldwell, 434 F .2d at 1089. 
58 Caldwell v. United States, 402 U.S. 942 (1971), rev'd sub nom. Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 402 U.S. 942 (1971), aff'd 408 
U.S. 665; In re Pappas, 402 U.S. 942 (1971), affd sub nom. Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665. 
Caldwell opposed the petition for certiorari on several grounds, none of which was or is 
particularly compelling. Brief in Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 
1081 (9th CiT. 1970) (No. 70-57). Indeed, the brief merely "suggests that this case presents 
an inopportune occasion for the exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction." Id. 
59 Affidavit of Paul M. Branzburg, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-85), at 51-52. 
6°Id. 
61Id. 
62 Paul M. Branzburg, The Hash They Make Isn't To Eat, THE COURIER-JOURNAL, 
Nov. 15, 1969. 
63 Id. at 3-4. 
64 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667. 
65 !d. at 668. 
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Branzburg's counsel, Edgar A. Zingman, argued that Kentucky's shield law66 
permitted Branzburg to protect his sources, but Judge J. Miles Pound rejected the 
argument and directed Branzburg to answer the question.67 Zingman objected, 
citing both the shield law and the press clause of the First Amendment, and 
petitioned the Court of Appeals for an injunction against enforcement of Pound's 
order.68 The petition urged the court to grant relief based on the state shield law, 
the state constitution, and the United States Constitution as "an interference with 
the exercise of freedom of the press [which] would permit courts to destroy that 
confidential relationship which is essential to a free press .... ,,69 
The Court of Appeals granted a temporary restraining order the same day,70 
but a year later denied the petition over a single dissent. 7l Branzburg filed a motion 
to reconsider72 based on the newly issued opinion of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Caldwell v. United States. 73 In January 1971, the 
Court of Appeals issued a revised opinion without substantive change.74 The court 
did not address the constitutional issue, and Caldwell was never mentioned by 
name.75 A further motion to stay the order pending petition for certiorari76 was 
denied.77 
66 The statute provides: "No person shall be compelled to disclose in any legal 
proceeding or trial before any court, or before any grand or petit jury, dr before the 
presiding officer of any tribunal, or his agent or agents, or before the General Assembly, or 
any committee thereof, or before any city or county legislative body, or any committee 
thereof, or elsewhere, the source of any information procured or obtained by him, and 
published in a newspaper or by a radio or television broadcasting station by which he is 
engaged or employed, or with which he is connected." Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.100 (2009). 
67 Order, In re: 141087, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 
(1972) (No. 70-85), at 6. 
68 Petition for Temporary and Permanent Restraining Order and Writ of Mandamus, 
in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at 8-11. 
69Id. 
70 Order of the Court Granting Temporary Restraining Order, in Branzburg App., 
supra note 27, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at 12. 
71 Opinion of the Court by Commissioner Vance Dismissing Petition for Writ of 
Prohibition and Writ of Mandamus, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Branzburg, 408 
U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at 13. 
72 Motion to Reconsider, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 
(No. 70-85), at 21. 
73 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970). 
74 Opinion of the Court by Commissioner Vance,.supra note 71, at 22. 
75 [d. at 24 n.1. In that footnote, the court held that Branzburg had abandoned the 
constitutional argument and it therefore limited its consideration to the' statutory 
interpretation of protected "sources" under the Kentucky shield law. The Uniteci States 
Supreme Court would later reject that view, holding the constitutional question was 
properly preserved for appeal. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,671 n. 6. (1972). 
76 Motion for an Order Staying the Effective Date of the Court's Order, in Branzburg 
App., supra note 27, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at 29. 
77 Order (modified Jan. 22, 1971), in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Branzburg, 408 
U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at 29. 
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Even before the revised opinion was issued, Branzburg had published two 
more controversial stories based on observations and interviews with Kentucky 
drug users.78 Once again, he was subpoenaed, this time to appear before the 
Franklin County grand jury.79 Once again he refused, submitting instead a motion 
to quash the subpoena.8o At the same time, he filed another petition with the 
. Kentucky Court of Appeals for injunctive reliefY 
Judge Henry Meigs denied the motion subject to issuance of a protective 
order in accordance with Caldwell. 82 After hearing arguments from Branzburg and 
the Commonwealth, Meigs issued the protective order, which limited the 
testimony Branzburg would be required to give to his personal observation of 
criminal activity.83 Specifically, he would not be required to reveal confidential 
sources or anything told him in confidence.84 
That same day, the Kentucky Court of AppealS denied the petition for 
injunctive reliefl5 and issued its opinion three days later.86 The Court of Appeals 
went to great lengths to distinguish Branzburg's case from the new Caldwell 
decision in the Ninth Circuit on their respective facts. 87 The court also expressed 
"misgivings" about the rule announced in Caldwell as a "drastic departure from the 
generally recognized rule" that journalists' sources are not privileged under the 
First Amendment.88 Once again, Branzburg's motion to stay the order89 was 
78 Paul M. Branzburg, Pot Problem Byproduct: Disrespect for the Law, THE 
COURIER-JOURNAL & TIMES (Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 10, 1971; Paul M. Branzburg, Rope 
Turns to Pot: Once an Industry, Kentucky Hemp Has Become a Drug Problem, THE 
COURIER-JOURNAL & TIMES, Jan. 10, 1971. 
79 Franklin Circuit Court Grand Jury Subpoena, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, 
Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at 29. 
80 Motion to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, 
Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at 43. 
81 Petition for Temporary and Permanent Restraining Order and Writ of Prohibition, 
in Branzburg App., supra. note 27, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at 47. 
82 Order, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at 
45. 
83 Protective Order, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 
70-85), at 46. 
84 Id. 
85 Order Denying Prohibition and Mandatory Relief, in Branzburg App., supra note 
27, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at 54. 
86 Opinion· for the Court by Commissioner Vance Denying Petition for Order of 
Prohibition, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at 
55. 
87 Id. at 57-59. 
88Id. at 59. 
89 Motion for an Order Staying the Effective Date of the Court's Order and Motion 
for a Temporary Writ of Prohibition, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Branzburg, 408 
U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at 61--62. 
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denied.90 As noted above, Branzburg's petition for certiorari was granted by the 
United States Supreme Court on May3, 1971. 
C. The Pappas Case 
The Pappas case also involved reporting on the Black Panther movement of 
the early 1970s.91. Paul Pappas was a television reporter and photographer for 
WTEV-TV in New Bedford, Massachusetts,92 working out of the station's office in 
East Providence, Rhode Island.93 On July 30, 1970, he was called to New Bedford 
to cover civil disorders there from the Panther perspective.94 He was given an 
address for the Party's storefront headquarters, and after one false start he threaded 
his way through the barricades and gained entry.95 There, about 3 p.m., he recorded 
and photographed a prepared statement read by one of the Panther leaders.96 
Pappas apparently took his story back to the station after receiving permission 
to return to Panther headquarters.97 He returned about 9 p.m. and was allowed to 
enter and remain inside the headquarters on the condition that he not disclose 
anything he saw or heard there.98 If, as the Panthers anticipated, the police raided 
the headquarters, Pappas would be free to report and photograph as he wished.99 
The raid never occurred, and Pappas wrote nothing further about the three hours he 
spent at Panther headquarters that night. 
100 . 
Two months later, Pappas was summoned to appear before the Bristol County 
grand jury, where he claimed a First Amendment privilege to decline to answer 
any questions about his observations and conversations at Panther headquarters 
that night. 101 When he was again directed to appear before the grand jury a few 
days later, he filed a motion to quash on First Amendment grounds because he 
feared "that any future possibilities of obtaining information to be used in my work 
would be definitely jeopardized, inasmuch as I wouldn't be trusted or couldn't gain 
anyone's confidence to acquire any information in reporting the news as it is.,,I02 
Pappas also said he feared for his personal safety.103 
63. 
90 Order, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at 
91 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672. 
92 See VAN GERPEN, supra note 18, at 39. 
93 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672. 
94Id. 
95 VAN GERPEN, supra note 18, at 39. 




100 Id.; see also VAN GERPEN, supra note 18, at 39 ("A police raid did not occur that 
evening and Pappas kept his promise: He did not write a story about his visit."). 
101 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 673. 
102 Brieffor Petitioner at 9, In re Pappas, 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (No. 70-94). 
103 V AN GERPEN, supra note 18, at 40. 
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The motion to quash was denied by the trial judge, who noted the absence of a 
shield law in Massachusetts and held there was no constitutional privilege. l04 
"Pappas does not have any privilege and must respond to the subpoena and testify 
to such questions as may be put to him by the Grand Jury relating to what he saw 
and heard, and the identity of any persons he may have seen.,,105 The case was 
reported by the superior court directly to the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts for an interlocutory ruling. 106 
Despite receiving "helpful and thorough briefs ... filed by Massachusetts and 
New York attorneys on behalf of a number of broadcasting, television, and news 
gathering interests,,,107 the Supreme Judicial Court on January 29, 1971, refused to 
follow Caldwell, on which Pappas and amici "seem[ed] greatly to rely on .... " 108 
To follow that opinion, the court said, would be to engage in "judicial amendment 
of the Constitution or judiciallegislation.,,109 The court concluded that the Superior 
Court was correct in holding that Pappas had no privilege. IIO As it did in 
Branzburg and Caldwell, the United States Supreme Court granted Pappas's 
petition for certiorari on May 3, 1971. III 
D. In the Supreme Court 
The three cases were thoroughly briefed in the United States Supreme Court, 
and oral arguments were conducted on February 22, 1972, in Caldwell, and the 
very next day in Branzburg and Pappas. 112 On June 29, 1972, the Court issued its 
opinion, with Justice Byron R. White writing for the Court.!l3 The decision has 
been described and analyzed many times,114 including by this author. 115 This 
Article returns to the opinion in Part V; for now, it will suffice to say that the Court 
reversed Caldwell and affirmed Branzburg and Pappas, finding no testimonial 
privilege for reporters in the First Amendment. 116 While Justice White 
104 Report of Superior C~urt for Bristol County, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, In 
re Pappas, 402 U.S. 942 (No. 70-94), at 6-8. . . 
105 Id. at 8. 
106 /d. 
107 In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297,299 n.2 (Mass. 1971). 
108 /d. at 301-02. 
109 Id. at 302. 
110 Id. at 304. 
III In re Pappas, 402 U.S. 942, 942 (1971). 
112 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,665 (1972). 
113 /d. 
114 See supra note lO and accompanying text. 
115 Eric B. Easton, Two Wrongs Mock a Right: Overcoming the Cohen Maledicta 
That Bar First Amendment Protection for Newsgathering, 58 OHIO ST. LJ. 1135, 1149-50 
(1997). 
116 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 708. 
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acknowledged that news gathering qualifies for some measure of First Amendment 
protection,J17 the Court was deeply divided as to the scope of that protection. 
Writing in dissent, Justice Douglas would have found that journalists have "an 
absolute right not to appear before a grand jury .... ,,118 Also in dissent, Justice 
Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, would have affirmed the 
balancing test in Caldwell. 119 Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, interpreted 
Justice White's opinion for the Court as requiring courts to strike "a proper balance 
between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant 
testimony with respect to criminal conduct.,,120 
Although Powell's concurring opinion is sometimes seen as a fifth vote for an 
undefined reporter's privilege,121 Justice White's opinionl22 is more widely viewed 
as a stunning defeat for the press with lasting precedential consequences.123 Yet 
mainstream media organizations initiated the litigation that led to the Branzburg 
decision. Mainstream media organizations made the decision to appeal all of these 
cases to the United States Courts of Appeals and two of them to the United States 
Supreme Court. And mainstream media organizations provided the theoretical 
foundation for all the appeals through party and amicus briefs. That makes 
Branzburg an excellent candidate to further explore how the press makes strategic 
litigation decisions. 
III. JOURNALISTIC VALUES 
In each of the cases considered in this Article, the reporters-Earl Caldwell, 
Paul Branzburg, and Paul Pappas-were confronted with three choices: (1) testify 
before the grand jury, breaking one or more promises of confidentiality; (2) refuse 
to testify and risk being jailed for contempt of court; or (3) litigate the issue to 
avoid either testifying or going to jail. Assuming their employers would pay for 
117 !d. at 681("We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or assembly 
to the country's welfare. Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First 
Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the 
press could be eviscerated."). 
118 Id. at 712 (Douglas, 1., dissenting). 
119 See id. at 747 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
120 !d. at 710 (powell, J., concurring). 
121 See, e.g., In re Roche, 448 U.S. 1312, 1315 (1980) (expressing the view that 
Branzburg stands for the proposition that the First Amendment provides some degree of 
protection for a reporter's confidences); see also Goodale, supra note 32, at 709 
(discussing Justice Powell's concurrence as supporting a "qualified newsman's privilege" 
judged on a case-by-case basis). 
122 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667 (White, 1., joined by Burger, c.J., Blackmun, Powell, 
& Rehnquist, J.1). 
123 See, e.g., Laurence B. Alexander, Looking Gut for the Watchdogs: A Legislative 
Proposal Limiting the Newsgathering Privilege to Journalists in the Greatest Need of 
Protection for Sources and Information, 20 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 97, 110 (2002) 
(discussing how reporters were unable to convince the Court to recognize a constitutional 
privilege to "protect their confidential sources and information"). 
1306 UT AH LAW REVIEW [NO.4 
litigation, the reporters' choices were not surprising. But litigation costs money, 
not only in attorney fees and court costs, but also in lost productivity and general 
distraction. The logical economic choice for their employers would be to 
encourage the reporters to testify. As noted above, the Times Company initially 
opposed Caldwell's refusal to comply with the subpoenal24 and his appeal to the 
Ninth Circuit, but there is no indication that financial considerations played a role 
in that decision. 125 Moreover, the company ultimately joined Caldwell's motion to 
quash the original subpoena.126 
In the end, all three cases were litigated, suggesting that the personal or 
journalistic values at stake transcended economics. Caldwell's fear for his personal 
safety certainly weighed heavily in his desire to litigate rather than appear or 
testify, but he never believed his employer shared that concern.127 Nor was fear 
Caldwell's sole motivation; appearing before the grand jury would, at minimum, 
deprive him of the access he needed to fulfill his self-described "mission to tell the 
truth, to tell the story.,,128 The briefs and oral arguments presented in the three 
cases suggest three core journalistic values that might be considered fundamental: 
1. Satisfying the public's "right to know"; 
2. Upholding the reporter's ethical responsibility; 
3. Preventing press entanglement with government. 129 
This Article turns to the filings to see how these three values were asserted as 
journalistic justifications for finding a reporter's privilege in the First Amendment. 
A. Right to Know 
Much has been written, pro and con, about the public's so-called "right to 
knoW.,,130 Often, the question is framed as whether the First Amendment's press 
clause contemplates something more than the absence of governmental restriction 
on the right to publish the information one already knows, including an affirmative 
right to acquire information in the public interest. Whatever the legal soundness of 
that proposition, it is axiomatic that the journalistic enterprise depends utterly upon 
124 See supra notes 36-58 and accompanying text. 
125 See supra notes 36-58 and accompanying text. 
126 See supra notes 27-58 and accompanying text. John Bates of Pillsbury, Madison 
& Sutro represented the Times. 
127 Caldwell Interview, supra note 11. 
128 Id. 
129 See, e.g., Brief of the New York Times Co. et al. as Amici Curiae at 2-4, Caldwell 
v. United States, 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (No. 70-57) (arguing in favor of a qualified 
privilege); Brief for the Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 4-5, 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-85) (urging the Court to adopt an 
absolute privilege to ensure separation of new sources from government). 
130 See, e.g., Eric B. Easton, Public Importance: BalanCing Proprietary Rights and 
the Right to Know, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139, 141 (2003) (arguing that "the First 
Amendment's penumbral 'right to know' is the source of a 'public importance test"'). 
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the public's right to know in justifying not only its "preferred position,,131 in our 
democratic society, but its very existence.132 
In each of the three Branzburg cases, the argument growing out of this value 
goes something like this: requiring reporters to testify before grand juries would 
undermine any promise of confidentiality that a reporter might extend to sources of 
information, thus have a chilling effect on sources' willingness to provide 
information that the public has a right to know. One or another version of this 
argument is not only present in each of the cases, it is central to all of them. Paul 
Branzburg's argument to the Supreme Court states the argument this way: 
A. Newsgathering activities are essential to the effective functioning 
of a free press, and as such are protected by the First Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States. A significant portion of such 
news gathering activities is the development by individual reporters of 
confidential informants who give information to the reporter with the 
understanding that some or all of the information or the source of such 
information will not be revealed. 
B. The courts below are attempting to force the Petitioner to appear 
before a grand jury to answer questions pertaining to the identities of 
such informants and unpublished information received from them. Such 
compelled testimony will inevitably discourage these and other 
informants from contacting and talking to reporters, as well as 
discourage the reporter from publishing information gathered from such 
sources. This inability of the press to be able to obtain such information, 
or its reluctance to use such information, is a severe abridgment of the 
freedom of the press protected by the First Amendment. 133 
In his brief for The New York Times and other amici on Caldwell's behalf, 
noted attorney and Yale law professor Alexander Bickel stated the case even more 
succinctly: 
The people's right to be informed by print and electronic news 
media is thus the central concern of the First Amendment's Freedom of 
Speech and of the Press Clause .... [If] an obligation is imposed by law 
on a reporter of news to disclose the identity of confidential sources ... 
the reporter's access to news, and therefore the public's access, will be 
severely constricted and in some circumstances shut off. The reporter's 
access is the public's access .... The issue here is the public's right to 
131 See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) ("Freedom of press, 
freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position."). 
132 BILL KOVACH & TOM ROSENSTIEL, THE ELEMENTS OF JOURNALISM 17 (2001) 
("The primary purpose of journalism is to provide citizens with the information they need 
to be free and self-governing.") .. 
133 Brief for Petitioner Paul M. Branzburg at 9, Branzburg v. Hayes, 40~ U.S. 665 
(1972) (No. 70-85). 
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know. That right is the reporter's by virtue of the proxy which the 
Freedom of the Press Clause of the First Amendment gives to the press 
on behalf of the public. 134 
In its brief supporting Branzburg, the American Newspaper Publishers 
Association (ANPA) argued similarly that "but for the assurance of confidence, 
many controversial issues presented in the daily newspapers of this country would 
otherwise never reach the typesetting stage.,,135 And at oral argument, Branzburg's 
attorney, Edgar Zingman, insisted that "it is necessary to the functioning of the 
press, and it has been a part of the process of the press, that such confidences be 
given, and those confidences are the condition upon which information is available 
to the public.,,136 
In Pappas and Caldwell, the argument is pressed, not only by the parties and 
amici, but through affidavits from prominent individual journalists. Pappas's 
petition for certiorari contains the following footnote: 
In an amicus brief filed in this case by the Columbia Broadcasting 
System, Inc., before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 
correspondents Walter Cronkite, Eric Sevareid, Mike Wallace, Dan 
Rather and Marvin Kalb submitted affidavits strongly asserting the 
necessity of preserving confidentiality in newsgathering and 
demonstrating that the betrayal of news sources and private 
communications would seriously diminish the effectiveness of reporting 
and the amount and nature of news available to the public. Example after 
example was given, from talks with bartenders to discussions with the 
President of the United States, in which it was essential to preserve 
confidentiality .137 
These affidavits, which were originally submitted as part of the record in 
Caldwell, along with others from New York Times and Newsweek reporters,138 
prompted the Massachusetts court to remark upon the "substantial news media 
pressure for adoption" of a reporter's privilege. 139 Indeed, more than twenty major 
news organizations filed amicus briefs supporting the three reporters in these 
134 Brief of the New York Times Co. et ai., supra note 129, at 16. 
135 Brief for the Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, supra note 129, at 8. 
136 Transcript of Oral Argument, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 u.s. 665 (1972) (No. 70-
85), reprinted in 74 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 678 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 
1975). . 
137 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Judicial Court for the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts at 12 n.9, In re Pappas, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-94). 
138 Affidavits Attached to Supplemental Memorandum of The New York Times and 
Newsweek, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Caldwell v. United States, 402 U.S. 942 
(1971) (No. 70-57), at 37-50. 
139 In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297,303 n.11 (Mass. 1971). 
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cases I4°--each emphasizing the "right to know" value and the threat to that value 
by a chilling effect on sources or self-censorship by reporters. 141 
B. Ethical Responsibility 
If the "right to know" value provided the principal justification for finding a 
reporter's privilege in the First Amendment, the "ethical responsibility" value 
might be seen as a normative supplement to the instrumentalism of "right to 
know." As the current version of the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) 
Code of Ethics makes clear, journalists are expected to keep their promises of 
confidentiality to sources. 142 Because the normative argument is far less 
compelling to a court, however, it is barely mentioned within the Branzburg 
advocacy documents. 
The "ethical responsibility" notion does surface in the Radio Television News 
Directors Association (RTNDA) brief, at least in a footnote: 
Until now reporters have often risked contempt convIctions in 
challenging compulsory process for the disclosure of confidential 
information; they have been encouraged to do so by a belief that there is 
First Amendment underpinning for their position, as well as by moral 
commitments to informants. In this manner confidential relationships 
have been supported by the reporter's fulfillment of his promise not to 
betray confidences, even though several lower courts have refused to 
recognize a constitutional privilege. If, however, the Supreme Court were 
to rule in such a way as to remove or seriously compromise the legal 
140 The organizations were the American Broadcasting Co., American Newspaper 
Publishers Association, American Newspaper Guild, American Society of Newspaper 
Editors, Associated Press Broadcasters' Association, Associated Press Managing Editors 
Association, Association of American Publishers, Authors League of America, Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Chicago Daily News, Chicago Sun-Times, Chicago Tribune Co., 
Dow Jones, National Press Photographers Association, National Broadcasting Co., 
Newsweek, New York Times, Radio Television News Directors Association, Sigma Delta 
Chi, Washington Post Co., and a coalition of religious broadcasters, as well as the 
American Civil Liberties Union. See infra notes 248, 251-254, 256--260. 
141 See, e.g., Brief for New York Times Co. et aI., supra note 129, at 35 ("[R]equiring 
a reporter to disclose information obtained in confidence would chill ... a substantial flow 
of news to the public."). 
142 SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS, CODE OF ETHICS (1996), 
http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.pdf ("Identify sources whenever feasible. The public is 
entitled to as much information as possible on sources' reliability. Always question 
sources' motives before promising anonymity. Clarify conditions attached to any promise 
made in exchange for information. Keep promises."). 
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underpinning of this basic ethic o/journalists, a reporter would not be so 
likely to guarantee confidentiality unconditionally. 143 
Notwithstanding thi~ decidedly minimal treatment in the Branzburg cases, the 
"ethical responsibility" rationale exists independently ,within the journalism 
community. Ironically, evidence of this comes from the betrayal of a confidential 
source that led to another Supreme Court opinion written by Justice White. l44 In 
Cohen v. Cowles Media, reporters for the Minneapolis Star Tribune and St. Paul 
Pioneer Press, among others, accepted an offer by Dan Cohen, a Republican 
campaign operative, for information concerning Marlene Johnson, the Democratic-
Farmer-Laborite candidate for lieutenant governor of Minnesota, in exchange for a 
promise of confidentiality. 145 Cohen then provided the reporters with court records 
showing the candidate had two trivial arrests, leading to dismissed charges in one 
case and a vacated conviction in the other. 146 
Editors at both papers independently decided to print the story, not of the 
candidate's indiscretions, but of Cohen's "dirty trick" and, over their reporters' 
protests, to identify Cohen by name. 147 As the author has previously noted: 
While the Pioneer Press editors buried Dan Cohen's name deep in 
the story, the Star Tribune editors featured it, apparently reasoning that 
the value of the story, ifany, lay in Cohen's conduct, not Johnson's. The 
Star Tribune also attacked Cohen in its editorial pages, but neither paper 
reported that it had broken a promise of confidentiality with Cohen. 148 
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court upheld Cohen's claim for damages 
against the newspapers for breaking their promise of confidentiality. 149 
From the editors' perspective, the public's "right to know" trumped the 
reporters' "ethical responsibility" to keep their promises. From the protesting 
reporters' perspective, the reverse was true. Either way, this episode shows that 
these values are independent, although related, and both are fundamental; the 
Cohen case is still debated in newsrooms today. 
C. Government Entanglement 
The third journalistic value found in the Branzburg documents is an aversion 
to serving as, or at least being perceived as, an agent of the government. Again, 
143 Brief for Radio Television News Directors Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at 7 n.4, Caldwell v. United States, 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (No. 70-57) (emphasis 
added). 
144 Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 




149 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670. 
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this value is related to the "right to know," but it has implications beyond 
news gathering to suggest an effect on reporting as well. Indeed, two of Kovach 
and Rosenstiel' s nine "elements of journalism" stress independence: independence 
from faction and independence from power. 150 
As discussed in ANPA's amicus brief in Caldwell, "the subpoenas involved in 
these appeals pierce the wall traditionally separating the press and the 
government.,,151 ANPA quoted extensively on that point from the Ninth Circuit 
opinion: 
If the Grand Jury may require appellant to make available' to it 
information obtained by him in his capacity as news gatherer, then the 
Grand Jury and the Department of Justice have the power to appropriate 
appellant's investigative efforts to their own behalf-to convert him after 
the fact into an investigative agent of the Government. The very concept 
of a free press requires that the news media be accorded a measure of 
autonomy; that they should be free to pursue their own investigations to 
their own ends without fear of governmental interlerence; and that they 
should be able to protect their investigative processes. 152 
The Newspaper Guild's brief in Caldwell and Pappas also quoted the Ninth 
Circuit passage and further asserted that widespread use of the press as a 
government agency was responsible for increasing violence against reporters by 
police and participants during public demonstrations. 153 "Not only does the prolific 
use of the subpoena impress a governmental function on the press; the practice, in 
addition to the destruction of communication with confidential news sources, 
significantly impairs the ability of the newsman to report public events of great 
significance." 154 
Still another danger of "government entanglement" caught the ACLU's 
attention: abuse of the grand jury process to harass reporters. Once conceived as a 
buffer between the state and the people, the civil liberties group said, grand juries 
have increasingly become "rubber stamps" for prosecutors and "instrument[s] for 
police investigation.,,155 
The prosecutor simply sits back, waits for the reporter to investigate and 
then causes the grand jury to issue a sweeping subpoena, regardless of 
the effects on the journalist's relationship to his confidential sources. 
150 KOVACH & ROSENSTlEL, supra note 132, at 94, 112. 
151 Brief for the Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, supra note 129, at 8-9. 
152 Id. at 9 (citing Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081; 1086 (9th CiT. 1970)). 
153 Brief for the Am. Newspaper Guild et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 7, Caldwell v. United States, 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (No. 70-57), and In re 
Pappas, 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (No. 70-94). 
154 Id. 
155 Brief for the Am. Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 28, Caldwell v. United States, 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (No. 70-57). 
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Equally dangerous is the possibility that overbroad grand jury subpoenas 
will be used to penalize reporters who write news stories which the 
government finds objectionable and to deter such stories in the future. 156 
All of the foregoing demonstrates convincingly that the cases consolidated in 
Branzburg v. Hayes involved values the press considers fundamental to its 
constitutional role. A successful outcome in the litigation would have yielded 
statutory or constitutional interpretations that would have vindicated those values 
and greatly facilitated the work of all journalists. But that alone is not enough to 
justify the time and treasure the press put into this case. Part IV examines the 
relative costs, benefits, and likelihood of success of the Branzburg litigation. 
IV. STRATEGY 
As noted above, the fact that these cases were litigated at all suggests that 
fundamental values were at stake. This Part posits that the decision to pursue these 
cases also depended on the parties' assessment of the benefits of success, the costs 
of failure, and the probability of either outcome. We begin by exploring the factors 
. that may have led the media lawyers to think they could win. 
A. Probability of Success 
To reconstruct the participants' perception as to the probability of success or 
failure in the Branzburg cases, this section first examines precedent and related 
doctrines-particularly in the lower courts, where prior decisions may be binding 
and where stare decisis and other canons of jurisprudence are more compelling 
than in the highest courts. Second, this section analyzes judicial preferences, 
including political ideology, judicial philosophy, and attitudes toward the press, 
from the litigants' perspective. Finally, this section looks at public policy, as 
articulated in statutes and executive practices. 
1. Precedent 
As a general proposition, precedent and other jurisprudential considerations 
should have operated to discourage the litigants from pursuing these cases. But the 
Caldwell decision in the Ninth Circuit may well have created the impression in the 
Branzburg and Pappas camps that the weight of precedent could be overcome. 157 
156 Id. at 29. 
157 Pappas specifically told the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that he 
would file a petition for certiorari "[i]n view of the conflict between the decision of our 
court in the Matter of Paul Pappas and the decision of the Federal Court in the Matter of 
Caldwell vs. United States." Application for Stay of the Order of the Supreme Judicial 
Court, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, In re Pappas, 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (No. 70-94), at 
24. 
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The most widely cited judicial precedent rejecting the reporter's testimonial 
privilege was Garland v. Torre,158 an appeal from a criminal contempt holding. In 
the underlying case, singer Judy Garland had filed a libel claim against the 
Columbia Broadcasting System based on allegedly defamatory statements about 
her that appeared in a New York Herald Tribune column. 159 The statements were 
attributed to an unnamed CBS executive, and columnist. Marie Torre refused to 
identify the source of the statements when the court ordered her to do SO.160 In an 
opinion authored by then Judge (later Justice) Potter Stewart; a Second Circuit 
panel declined to find a constitutional privilege that would protect Torre's 
source. 161 
The court accepted the "hypothesis that compulsory disclosure of a 
journalist's confidential sources of information may entail an abridgment of press 
freedom by imposing some limitation upon the availability of news.,,162 But the 
court pointed out that the freedom so abridged is not absolute, saying, "What must 
be determined is whether the interest to be served by compelling the testimony of 
the witness in the present case justifies some impairment of this First Amendment 
freedom.;,163 Quoting Chief Justice Hughes's admonition that giving testimony is 
the duty of every citizen,164 the court extended the principle to the press. "If an 
additional First Amendment liberty-the freedom of the press-is here involved, 
we do not hesitate to conclude that it too must give place under the Constitution to 
a paramount public interest in the fair administration of justice.,,165 
Although Garland was not binding on any of the courts involved in the 
Branzburg cases, Judge Stewart had noted that no previous court had found a 
reporter's privilege in the absence of a statute. 166 Although proponents of the 
privilege tried to distinguish Garland,167 the precedents overwhelmingly favored 
compelling reporters' testimony, and, of course, Judge Stewart had become Justice 
Stewart. 
The Ninth Circuit opinion in Caldwell was issued eleven days before the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals denied Paul Branzburg's motion to quash in 
Branzburg v. Pound. Ten days later, Branzburg filed a motion to reconsider that 
decision in light of the Caldwell holding. 168 The court reissued its original opinion, 
158 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958). 
159 !d. at 547. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 !d. at 548. 
163 !d. 
164 !d. at 549 (quoting Blackmerv. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932)). 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 550. 
167 See, e.g., Brieffor Petitioner, supra note 102, at 39 (distinguishing Garland). 
168 Motion to Reconsider, in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 
655 (1972) (No. 70-85), at 21-22. 
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adding only a footnote to assert that Branzburg had abandoned his constitutional 
argument, rendering Caldwell irrelevant without mentioning it. 169 
By the time Branzburg v. Meigs l70 reached the Kentucky Court of Appeals, 
Caldwell had been integrated into Branzburg's case. As noted above, the court 
both distinguished Branzburg from Caldwell on their facts and expressed 
"misgivings" about the rule announced in Caldwell. 171 Nevertheless, the Caldwell 
decision may well have given Branzburg's team the confidence that, in taking the 
case up to the Supreme Court, the weight of precedent would be a much closer. 
call. 
In Massachusetts, meanwhile, Pappas relied on the protective order granted 
by the district court in Caldwell to support his motion to quash.l72 Superior Court 
Justice Frank E. Smith noted that reliance, but otherwise did not address the new 
case in ruling that Pappas had no privilege. 173 By the time the Supreme Judicial 
Court reviewed Smith's ruling, the Ninth Circuit opinion in Caldwell had been out 
for about six weeks. Again, as discussed above, the precedent did not move the 
court,174 but it may well have encouraged Pappas to press on. 
But if the favorable Caldwell decisions encouraged Branzburg and Pappas to 
appeal their cases to the Supreme Court, precedent provides no explanation for 
Caldwell's decision to incur a contempt judgment by refusing to appear before the 
grand jury under the district court's protective order. Indeed, we know that Times 
Company General Counsel James Goodale and Caldwell's attorney, Anthony 
Amsterdam, looked at the same precedents and reached different conclusions. 
Amsterdam unequivocally told Caldwell that he had a "right" to refuse to testify,175 
while Goodale vigorously opposed Caldwell's taking the appeal because he fe'ared 
it would make "bad law.,,176 Goodale, the more experienced media lawyer, got the 
outcome right in the end. But Amsterdam was more in tune with his client's 
wishes, and the case moved ahead. 
2. Judicial Preferences 
One possible key to Amsterdam's assertion may have been a sense that the 
federal courts in California would be as sympathetic as any, anywhere in the 
country.177 Judge Zirpoli had been appointed by President John F. Kennedy and 
169 Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345,346 n.1 (Ky. 1971). 
170 Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W. 2d 748,750 (Ky. 1971). 
171 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
172 Report of Superior Court for Bristol County, supra note lO4, at 7. 
173 Id. at 7-8. . 
174 See supra notes lO8-lO9 and accompanying text. 
175 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
176 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
177 Caldwell is the focus of this discussion because it seems highly unlikely that 
either Branzburg or Pappas would have been motivated to pursue their cases by the 
ideology of their states' appellate courts. All seven justices who heard Pappas's case before 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court were appointed by Republican governors. 
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had served about ten years when the Caldwell case came up.178 For much of his 
career, however, he had been a prosecutor, serving as assistant district attorney for 
the City and County of San Francisco from 1928-1932, and as assistant United 
States attorney in Northern California from 1933-1944. 179 
On the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Republican appointees held an eight-
to-five edge over Democrats in 1970.180 The three-judge panel that Caldwell 
ultimately drew included Eisenhower appointee Charles Merton Merrill I 81 and 
Johnson appointee Walter Raleigh Ely, Jr.,182 as well as another Eisenhower 
appointee, William R. Jameson, a U.S. District Judge for the District of Montana, 
sitting by designation. 183 So if the ideology of the judges was a motivating factor, it 
was not predictable by party affiliation. Yet the overwhelmingly favorable opinion 
issued by the Ninth Circuit pariel made it all but inevitable that the government 
would seek and the Supreme Court would grant certiorari. 184 
Presumably, both Amsterdam and Goodale considered the preferences of the 
Supreme Court justices at some point during the litigation. But that consideration 
would have been strategically valuable only on or before June 4, 1970, when 
Caldwell incurred the contempt judgment that formed the basis for his appeal to 
Compare Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, 
http://www.massreports.com/justices/alljustices.aspx (last visited Dec. 1,2009) (listing' the 
justices' respective appointment dates), with Former Governors of Massachusetts from 
1780, http://www.netstate.com/states/governmentimajormergov.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 
2009) (listing the Governors of Massachusetts). Please note, according to the Justices of the 
Supreme Judicial Court Web site, Jacob Spiegel was appointed in 1960; however, his 
memorials state he was appointed in 1961, thereby making Governor Vope the appointing 
governor. Compare Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Justices of the Supreme 
Judicial Court, http://www.massreports.com/justices/alljustices.aspx (last visited Dec. 1, 
2009), with Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Memorials, http:// 
www.massreports.com/memorials/394maI115.htm (last visited Dec. I, 2009). The seven 
justices who heard Brimzburg's case before the Kentucky Court of Appeals, the state's only 
appeJlate court at the time, were all elected. See Commonwealth of Kentucky, Court of 
Justice, http://courts.ky.gov/courtofappeals (last visited Dec. I, 2009) (noting that 
"[fJourteen judges, two elected from seven appellate court districts, serve on the Court of 
Appeals"). Having lost decisively at the trial court level, both Branzburg and Pappas were 
likely to pursue their appeals through the state courts regardless of actual or perceived 
ideological preferences. 
178 Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, 
http://www.fjc.gov/publicihome.nsfihisj (search for Zirpoli) (last visited Dec. 1,2009). 
179 [d. 
180 [d. 
181 Federal Judicial Center, supra note 178 (search for Merrill). 
182 /d. (search for Ely). 
183 /d. (search for Jameson). 
184 See LEE EpSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 85-86 (1998) 
(suspecting that the Court is "reluctant to ignore disputes that the government wants them 
to resolve"). 
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the Ninth Circuit. 185 From that moment on, the decision to take the case to the 
Supreme Court was effectively out of his hands. 
The Burger Court in 1970 was ideologically divided into three groupS.186 On 
the left were Justices Hugo Black and William O. Douglas, very nearly First 
Amendment absolutists, and usually reliable liberals William Brennan and 
Thurgood Marshall. 187 On the right were Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice 
Harry Blackmun, then called "The Minnesota Twins" for their matched 
conservatism. 188 In the center were moderate Republicans John Marshall Harlan 
and Potter Stewart, as well as conservative Democrat Byron White. 189 Justices 
Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist, who would ultimately hear the Branzburg 
case, had not yet replaced Black and Harlan. 
The justices sitting in June 1970 had voted in sixteen press-related cases over 
the years. 190 Of the eighty-seven votes cast by the nine justices in those sixteen 
cases, sixty-one votes, or 70 percent of the total, were cast in favor of the press's 
position; only twenty-six votes, or 30 percent, were cast against the press's 
position.191 Amsterdam and Goodale were certainly aware that Black and Harlan 
were nearing retirement and that Richard Nixon was president, but the likelihood 
of success must still have looked strong based on ideological preferences in June 
1970. 
Moreover, Justice White's hostility toward the press had not begun to 
manifest itself before June 1970. To be sure, he had written one opinion that could 
be interpreted as denying broadcasters their full First Amendment rights/ 92 and 
two separate opinions l93 expressing reservations against broadly interpreting the 
standards in New York Times v. Sullivan.194 But the Red Lion decision had been 
185 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
186 See infra notes 188-189 and accompanying text. 
187 See CHARLES M. LAMB & STEPHEN C. HALPERN, THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL 
AND JUDICIAL PROFILES 110, 133 (1991). 
188 !d. at 68. 
189 See id. at 8, 193,376. 
190 The identification of press-related cases was taken from Easton, supra note 7, at 
261. 
191 The voting records came from the Congressional Quarterly, Inc., CQ Press 
Electronic Library, Supreme Court Collection, http://library.cqpress.com (last visited Dec. 
1,2009). 
192 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 385 (1969) (upholding the personal 
attack and editorial reply rules of the FCC's "Fairness Doctrine" against challenge by 
broadcasters). 
193 Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 22-23 (1970) (White, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (insisting that the press could be held liable for using words 
that might have both innocent and libelous meanings); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 
563, 583 (1968) (White, J., concurring in part- and dissenting in part) (refusing to follow the 
Court's dictum suggesting that proof of harm would be required to fire a public school 
teacher who made intentionally or recklessly false statements about the school board). 
194 376 U.S. 254,279,283 (1964) (requiring public officials to prove actual malice to 
prevail in a libel suit). 
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unanimous against the broadcasters,195 and White had supported the broadcasters 
in another important case, Estes v. Texas,196 by dissenting from the opinion that 
cameras in the courtroom were per se unconstitutional. 197 White also had 
unequivocally supported Sullivan itself and most of its progeny through 1970.198 
Although White's antipathy toward the press is said to date from his football 
days,199 its clear expression would only come later.2oo The Court had not heard any 
newsgathering cases before 1970, and Caldwell's legal team could not have 
anticipated the strength of White's opposition to extending First Amendment 
protection to newsgathering activities.201 
Ironically, Amsterdam must have counted Justice Potter Stewart among the 
likely opponents of the privilege. After all, he had been the author of the oft-cited 
Garland v. Torre202 decision when he served on the Second Circuit, and there was 
no reason to believe he would change his mind?03 A reasonable head count of the 
Supreme Court bench at the time would have found Black, Douglas, Brennan, and 
195 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
196 381 U.S. 532 (1965). 
197 Id. at 615-16 (White, 1., dissenting). 
198 See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. 
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 173-74 (1967) (Brennan, 1., dissenting) (joining a dissent more 
favorable to the press than the majority opinion); Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-91 
(1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 
74-75 (1964). 
199 DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHlZZER WHITE: A 
PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 449-50 (1998). 
200 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 390-91 (1974) (White, 1., 
dissenting) ("The communications industry has increasingly become concentrated in a few 
powerful hands operating very lucrative businesses reaching across the Nation and into 
almost every home. Neither the industry as a whole nor its individual components are 
easily intimidated, and we are fortunate that they are not. Requiring them to pay for the 
occasional damage they do to private reputation will play no substantial part in their future 
performance or their existence."); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 263 
(1974) (White, 1., concurring) ("To me it is a near absurdity to so deprecate individual 
dignity, as the Court does in Gertz, and to leave the people at the complete mercy of the 
press, at least in this stage of our history when the press, as the majority in this case so well 
documents, is steadily becoming more powerful and much less likely to be deterred by 
threats of libel suits."). 
201 In addition to Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), see White's majority 
opinions in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (holding promises of 
confidentiality from reporters to sources are enforceable against the press), and Zurcher v. 
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 567-68 (1978) (holding neither the First nor Fourth 
Amendments prohibited the government from using search warrants to recover evidence 
believed to be in newsrooms); see also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978) 
(White joining the majority and holding that the press has no greater right of access to 
government-held information than the general public); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 
833-35 (1974) (same); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (same). 
202 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958). 
203 See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
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Marshall solidly in favor of the privilege; Harlan, Burger, Blackmun, and Stewart 
solidly against; and White very probably in favor. 
In short, if Amsterdam· had conducted an analysis of judicial preferences 
before June 4, 1970, that analysis would have suggested that success was at least as 
likely as failure, if not more likely, and he would not have been dissuaded from 
taking the case further. Of course, no one could have predicted the appointments of 
Powell and Rehnquist to the Supreme Court, much less the pivotal role that Powell 
would come to play.204 To Caldwell, however, it was Rehnquist's appointment that 
was most problematic.2os Caldwell says the late Fred Graham, legal reporter for the 
Times and later CBS News, told him Rehnquist had been deeply involved in his 
case while serving in the Department of Justice.206 And he deeply believes that the 
Times Company's half-hearted support for his cause undermined Caldwell's 
efforts to persuade Rehnquist to recuse himself.207 Had he done so, the 4-4 decision 
would have affirmed the Ninth Circuit, although it would have had no precedential 
value.208 
3. Public Policy 
To this point, this Article has suggested that Caldwell may have been 
encouraged to try for a better First Amendment interpretation from the appellate 
courts based on the liberal reputation of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
generally and the still liberal-leaning United States Supreme Court, which had 
overwhelmingly supported the press in recent years. It has further suggested that 
Branzburg and Pappas may well have been encouraged to seek Supreme Court 
review of their cases, despite the absence of compelling precedent, based on the 
Caldwell decision in the Ninth Circuit. 
To help determine how realistic those expectations might have been, this 
section now turns to public policy considerations. Public policy is broadly defined 
as the expressipn of the people's will by the political branches of government 
through statutes and executive practice.209 Here, identifying the prevailing public 
policy requires us to examine the prevalence of reporter's shield laws and the 
policies of the Department of Justice on issuing subpoenas commanding reporters 
to testify. The analysis will show that, while only Branzburg had a legitimate 
expectation based on public policy of a better deal than he got from the courts, all 
three journalists might have been encouraged by new Department of Justice rules 
governing reporters' testimony. 
Perhaps the best place to begin a discussion of the relevant public policy is 
Wigmore's hoary dictum th~t "the public ... has a right to every man's 
204 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
205 Caldwell Interview, supra note II. 
206 Id .. 
207 /d. 
208 /d. Caldwell points to a memo posted by Managing Editor Abe Rosenthal stating, 
'''We all feel bad for Earl Caldwell and the difficult position he finds himselfin. '" Id. 
209 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1267 (8th ed. 2004). 
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evidence,,,21o quoted in one form or another throughout these cases.211 All 
testimonial privileges, whether grounded in statute, common law, or the 
Constitution, are exceptions to this general rule and, according to traditional 
principles of interpretation, must therefore be narrowly construed. 
Of the three jurisdictions involved in this case, only Kentucky had enacted a 
testimonial privilege for reporters, often called a reporter's shield law.212 That 
statute was the principal basis, along with constitutional arguments, for 
Branzburg's initial request for injunctive relief and subsequent state court 
appeals.213 Ultimately, the Court of Appeals ruled that the shield law was 
inapplicable because it protected only the "source" of Branzburg's information and 
not his personal observations.214 
The court took great pains to distinguish the "source" of any information 
procured by a reporter, whose identity was privileged by the statute, from the 
"information" itself. 215 Here, Branzburg was not asked to reveal the identity of any 
informants he may have had, the court said, but rather the identity of persons he 
saw committing a crime.216 
In all likelihood the present case is complicated by the fact that the 
persons who committed the crime were probably the same persons who 
informed Branzburg that the crime would be, or was being, committed. If 
so, this is a rare case where informants actually informed against 
themselves. But in that event the privilege which would have protected 
disclosure of their identity as informants cannot be extended beyond their 
role as informants to protect their identity in the entirely different role as 
perpetrators of a crime (emphasis in original).217 
Otherwise, the court said, a reporter who witnessed the assassination of the 
president or governor, or a bank robbery in progress, or a forcible rape, could not 
be required to identify the perpetrator.218 Chief Justice Edward P. Hill, writing in 
dissent, rejected that parade of horribles and called the majority view "a strained 
and unnecessarily narrow construction" of the term source.219 Hill pointed out that 
210 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2192 (John T. McNaughton 
rev. 1961). 
211 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972); In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 
297,299 (Mass. 1971). 
212 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (LexisNexis 2006). To this day, neither 
Massachusetts nor the federal government has enacted a similar statute. 
213 Petition for Temporary and Permanent Restraining Order and Writ of Mandamus, 
in Branzburg App., supra note 27, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-85), at 8-11. 
214 Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345,347-48 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970). 
215 /d. at 347-48. 
216 Id. at 348. 
217 /d. 
218 /d. 
219 See id. (Hill, C.J., dissenting). 
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the statute contained no such limitation and quoted extensively from a 
Pennsylvania case upholding that state's shield law. 
[I]mportant information, tips and leads will dry up and the public will 
often be deprived ofthe knowledge of dereliction of public duty, bribery, 
corruption, conspiracy and other crimes committed or possibly 
committed by public officials or by powerful individuals or 
organizations, unless newsmen are able to fully and completely protect 
the sources of their information. It is vitally important that this public 
shield against governmental inefficiency, corruption and crime be 
preserved against piercing and erosion. 
The [shield law] is a wise and salutary declaration of public policy 
whose spiritual father is the revered Constitutionally ordained freedom of 
the press. The Act must therefore, we repeat, be liberally and broadly 
construed in order to carry out the clear objective and intent of the 
Legislature which has placed the gathering and the protection of the 
source of news as of greater importance to the public interest and of 
more value to the public welfare than the disclosure of the alleged crime 
or the alleged criminal. 220 
But Chief Justice Hill was the only state judge in all of these cases to support 
the privilege. In the Pappas case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court took 
pains to point out that, "unlike certain other states," Massachusetts had created no 
reporter's privilege. 221 The court cited opposition to the privilege in the American 
Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence to support the rejection of both statutory 
and constitutional privileges.222 And in the Ninth Circuit, District Judge Jameson's 
concurring opinion also pointedly noted that Congress had not enacted a shield law 
as he expressed the view that Judge Zirpoli's protective order might have satisfied 
Caldwell's constitutional rights.223 . 
On the other hand, seventeen states had enacted shield laws by 1970,224 and 
several of those enactments had occurred only recently.225 One could reasonably 
expect that the Supreme Court might be swayed by the trend in public policy in 
favor of the privilege. The lawyers would also have been aware of a dramatic 
development within the Justice Department of President Richard Nixon. 
220 Id. at 349 (Hill, C.J., dissenting) (quoting In re Taylor, 193 A.2d 181, 185-86 (Pa. 
1963)). 
221 In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297,299 (Mass. 1971). 
222 Id. at 299-301. 
223 Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1092 (9th Cir. 1970) (Jameson, J., 
concurring). Jameson's comment regarding Congress's failure to enact a shield law was 
duly noted by Justice Cutter in his opinion for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 
Pappas. 266 N.E.2d at 302. 
224 For a list of state shield laws at the time, see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 691, 
689 n.27 (1972). 
225 Id. 
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During the oral arguments before the Ninth Circuit, counsel for the 
government submitted a press release from Attorney General John N. Mitchell, 
outlining new guidelines for issuing subpoenas to the news media. As summarized 
by Judge Jameson, the guidelines "expressly recognized that the 'Department does 
not approve of utilizing the press as a spring board for investigations. '" It further 
stated: 
There should be sufficient reason to believe that the information sought 
is essential to a successful investigation-particularly with reference to 
directly establishing guilt or innocence .... The government should have 
unsuccessfully attempted to obtain the information from alternative non-
press sources. . . . [S]ubpoenas should normally be limited to the 
verification of published information and to such surrounding 
circumstances as relate to the accuracy of the published information .... 
[S]ubpoenas should, wherever possible, be directed at material 
information regarding a limited subject matter, should cover a reasonably 
limited period of time, and should avoid requiring production of a large 
volume of unpublished materia1.226 
While the Justice Department's announcement of the gui~elines followed by 
two months Caldwell's critical decision on June 4, 1970, to refuse to appear, work 
on the guidelines was well under way before then. And although there is nothing in 
the record to indicate the extent of their knowledge, there is little doubt that 
. Caldwell and Amsterdam would have known about the guidelines at the time. The 
guidelines were being drafted by William H. Rehnquist, who was appointed by 
President Nixon in 1969 to be assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal 
Counsel,227 and Jack C. Landau, former Supreme Court reporter for the Newhouse 
News Service.228 Landau joined the Nixon Justice Department in 1969, only to 
leave in April 1970 to return to Newhouse.229 Landau had been a key figure in the 
early days of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, which was 
226 Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1091-92 n.3 (Jameson, J., concurring) (quoting John N. 
Mitchell, Free Press and Fair Trial: The Subpoena Controversy, Address Before House of 
Delegates, American Bar Association (Aug. 10, 1970)). The guidelines were formally 
published as United States Department of Justice Memorandum No. 692. 39 U.S.L.W. 
2111 (Aug. 25, 1970). A complete copy was also published in The New York Times, Aug. 
11, 1970, p. 24, and attached as an appendix to Levin v. Marshall, 317 F. Supp. 169, 173 
(D. Md. 1970). 
227 LIIILegal Information Institute, Cornell University, Supreme Court Collection, 
http://supct.law.comell.edu/supct/justices/rehnquist.hio.html (last visited Dec. 1,2009). 
228 Floyd J. McKay, First Amendment Guerillas: Formative Years of the Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press, 6 JOURNALISM & COMM. MONOGRAPHS 105, 112 
(2004). 
229 [d. 
l322 UTAH LAW REVIEW [No.4 
formed specifically to deal with the Caldwell case, and became executive director 
of the organization not long after his return to Newhouse.23o 
By the time briefs were filed in the United States Supreme Court, the 
guidelines were being held up by the journalists and amici as the government's 
recognition that grand jury inquiries could pose First Amendment problems.23i 
Perhaps the most extensive use of the guidelines appears in Alexander Bickel's 
amicus brief in Caldwell for the New York Times Co. and other media companies. 
Acknowledging that the guidelines do not have the force of law, Bickel said they 
nevertheless "evince most authoritatively a developing consensus of what the law 
should be.,,2J2 
Thus, taking three critical predictors of success-precedent, preferences, and 
public.policy-as a whole, the press had some reason to believe that it could win 
the fight for a testimonial privilege under the First Amendment. The Caldwell 
decision in the Ninth Circuit seemed likely to counterbalance older, adverse 
precedent,233 there seemed to be five potentially favorable votes on the Supreme 
Court, and public policy as articulated by several state legislatures and the 
Department of Justice seemed to be moving in the right direction. Additional 
factors, such as the strong support of amic?34-including the American Civil 
Liberties Union235 -and some of the nation's best legal talent, must have seemed 
sufficient to overcome the government's opposition.236 
230 The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, About the Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press: A Short History, http://www.rcfp.org/about.html(last 
visited Dec. 1,2009). 
231 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 102, at 17; see also Brief for Nat'l Broad. Co. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10-11, In re Pappas, 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (No. 70-
94). 
232 Brief of the New York Times Co. et aI., supra note 129, at 12. 
233 See Brief for Nat'l Broad. Co., supra note 231, at 9-10 (citing several similar 
lower court decisions around the same tirpe, including People v. Rios, No. 75129 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. July 15, 1970); People v. Dohrn, No. 69-3808 (Cook County, III. Cir. Ct. May 
20, 1970); Transcript of April 6, 1970 at 18-24,36, and Transcript of April 7, 1970 at 21, 
38-39, 149-51, Air Transp. Ass'n v. Profl Air Traffic Controllers Org., No. 70-C-400-4l0 
(E.D. N.Y. April 6--7, 1970); and Transcript of Dec. 4, 1969, Alioto v. Cowles Comm., No. 
52150 (N.D. CaL». 
234 Some scholarship suggests that disproportionately strong amici support may be 
counterproductive. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus 
Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 743, 829 (2000). However, those 
findings are certainly counterintuitive and probably would have surprised the litigants here. 
My own research on press cases suggests that support from press amici has been largely 
irrelevant to the outcome. See Easton, supra note 7, at 256. 
235 My previous research shows that the press has been far more successful when 
supported by the ACLU than when opposed by the ACLU, winning 76 percent of its cases 
with the ACLU on board and losing 83 percent when opposed by the ACLU. Easton, supra 
note 7, at 257. 
236 The federal government, of course, was a party opponent in Caldwell, and amicus 
curiae in Branzburg and Pappas. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,665--67 (1972). In 
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Even if some doubts remained about the likelihood of success, important 
forces within the media apparently concluded that the benefits of pursuing the 
cases to vict9ry-an absolute or qualified First Amendment privilege-outweighed 
the costs of defeat. The. next section turns to that cost-benefit analysis. 
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
It is hard to overstate how devastating the Branzburg precedent has been for 
newsgathering; the Supreme Court's refusal to find a meaningful First Amendment 
privilege in that case has been the foundation for numerous decisions minimizing 
any First Amendment right to gather news.237 Moreover, the high cost of an 
adverse decision in Branzburg was obviously apparent to Times Company General 
Counsel James Goodale, who warned Caldwell that his appeal to the Ninth Circuit 
could make "bad law.,,238 
On the other hand, a victory in Branzburg must have seemed especially 
beneficial in light of the Nixon administration's and local prosecutors' 
unprecedented use of subpoenas for reporters' sources, notes, pictures, and 
testimony that characterized the late 1960s.239 Particularly after the 1968 
Democratic convention, subpoenas targeting the coverage of anti-Vietnam War 
activists and Black Power militants like Caldwell's Panthers proliferated.240 
McKay calls the rapid increase in the number of subpoenas "staggering," citing 
research showing about· 500 subpoenas served on reporters between 1970 and 
1976, compared to about a dozen between 1960 and 1968.241 
either capacity, the government is unquestionably the most formidable opponent the press 
could face. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Government Gorilla: Why Does Government Come 
Out Ahead in Appellate Courts?, in IN LITIGATION: Do THE "HAVES" STILL COME OUT 
AHEAD? 343 (Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey eds., 2003); Easton, supra note 7, at 
257; Kearney & Merrill, supra note 234, at 829. 
237 See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media, Inc., 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1993) (citing 
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 665, for the proposition "that generally applicable laws do not 
offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has 
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news"); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 
438 U.S. I, II (1978) (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684, for the proposition that "there is 
no First Amendment right of access to information"); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 
547, 566 (1978) (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 665, for the proposition that "it does not 
make a constitutional difference" whether search warrants or subpoenas served on reporters 
will result in the disappearance of confidential sources or cause the press to suppress the 
news); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684-85, 
for the proposition that '" [n ]ewsmen have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of 
crime or disaster when the general public is excluded"'). 
238 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
239 McKay, supra note 228, at Ill. 
240 Id. 
241 /d. at 112. For a sense of the magnitude of the subpoena assault, see the list of 120 
subpoenas served on reporters from NBC, CBS, and their wholly owned stations included 
as an Appendix to Brief of the New York Times Co. et aI., supra note 129. 
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Of course, it is not possible to quantify and analyze the cost of a disastrous 
precedent in Branzburg versus the benefits of pennanent relief from the threat of 
subpoenas. But it is entirely .possible that a rough cost-benefit calculation, 
tempered by the probability of success, may have influenced the decision of 
most-but not all-media participants to ask the Supreme Court for a qualified, 
rather than absolute, testimonial privilege. An absolute privilege, going beyond the 
ruling of the Ninth Circuit, beyond even the benefits of most state shield laws, 
would have been the most desirable, yet least likely, outcome in the case. Thus, 
prudence would have dictated a reasoned argument for a qualified privilege-a 
somewhat less desirable, but far more likely, outcome-except for those 
participants who calculated that the benefits of an absolute shield outweighed the 
cost of losing the case altogether. 
The initial response to the subpoenas by Caldwell and the Times-a plea in 
the alternative to quash the subpoenas or issue a protective order242--certainly 
reflected a degree of caution. Even after the split between Caldwell and the Times, 
Caldwell's opposition to the government's petition for certiorari suggests they 
were reasonably satisfied with the Ninth Circuit opinion?43 Caldwell's brief in 
opposition suggested the Court could best confront "the vexing and difficult First 
Amendment problems presented by grand jury subpoenas addressed to newsmen 
... after more than one lower court has grappled with them.,,244 
In his brief to the Supreme Court, Amsterdam argued for a qualified privilege, 
but with a strong presumption of confidentiality.245 He insisted that a "compelling 
state interest" was required by the First Amendment to force a reporter to appear 
before a grand jury. 246 "The elements of such a showing are at least three," he said: 
(1) The 'infonnation sought must be demonstrably relevant to a 
clearly defined, legitimate subject of governmental inquiry .... ' 
(2) It must affinnatively appear that the inquiry is likely to turn up 
material information, that is: (a) that there is some factual basis for 
pursuing the investigation, and (b) that there is reasonable ground to 
conclude that the particular witness subpoenaed has infonnation material 
to it ... [and] 
(3) The infonnation sought must be unobtainable by means less 
destructive of First Amendment freedoms.247 
The New York Times also insisted on a "compelling interest" standard as 
amicus in the Supreme Court proceeding.248 Joined by NBC, CBS, and ABC, by 
242 Caldwell v. United States, 311 F. SllPP. 358, 360 (N.D. Cal. 1970). 
243 See Brief in Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Caldwell v. United 
States, 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (No. 70-57). 
244 Id. at 3. 
245 See Brieffor Respondent at 81, Caldwell, 402 U.S. 942 (No. 70-57). 
246 Id. 
247 Id. at 82-84. 
248 Brief of the New York Times Co. et aI., supra note 129, at 8. 
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the Chicago Sun-Times and Daily News, by the Associated Press Managing Editors 
and Broadcasters' Associations, and by the Association of American Publishers, 
the Times urged the Court to require the government to "clearly demonstrate a 
compelling and overriding interest in the information" before requiring a reporter 
to testify?49 The Times went on to explain that such a standard would preclude 
requiring a reporter's testimony "with respect to a category of crimes that cannot 
be deemed 'major,' as for example crimes variously characterized as 'victimless,' 
'regulatory,' and 'sumptuary. ",250 
Other amici urged a similar standard. For example, the Chicago Tribune 
sought· to limit testimony to evidence "so important that non-production thereof 
would cause a miscarriage of justice.,,251 The Radio Television News Directors 
Association characterized the desired standard as "irreparable harm," rather than 
"compelling interest," and said "the Court should adopt a standard which in the 
normal situation would raise no more than the slightest possibility of later 
disclosure.,,252 A "compelling need" standard was urged by the Authors League of 
America253 and a coalition of religious groups?54 
But even if one assumes that these groups advocated a balancing test, albeit 
with a very high standard, because they believed the benefits of an absolute 
privilege were outweighed by the cost of defeat,255 other media organizations 
reached the opposite conclusion. The American Newspaper Publishers 
Association, for example, openly broke with the Times and joint amici as to the 
standard required: 
Nothing short of an absolute privilege, under the First Amendment, 
vested in professional newsmen to refuse to testify before any tribunal 
about any information or source of information derived as a result of 
their reportorial functions will create the certainty needed to generate 
confidence in their promises, whether express or implied, to preserve 
either a source's anonymity or privacy, and thus guarantee the right of 
the public to be fully informed.256 
249 /d. 
250 [d. 
251 Brief for Chicago Tribune Co. as Amicus Curiae at 18, Caldwell v. United States, 
402 U.S. 942 (1971) (No. 70-57). 
252 Brief for Radio Television News Directors Ass'n, supra note 143, at 10. 
253 Brief of the Authors League of Am., Inc., as Amicus Curiae at 7, Caldwell, 402 
U.S. 492 (1971) (No. 70-57). 
254 Brief of Office of Communication of The United Church of Christ et al. as Amici 
Curiae at 22, Caldwell, 402 U.S. 492 (No. 70-57). 
255 Of course, there may be other, non-strategic reasons for advocating a qualified 
privilege, including a sincere belief that reporters should have to testify under some 
circumstances. 
256 Brieffor the Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, supra note 129, at 4. 
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ANPA was joined in that position by the Washington Post and Newsweek;257 
the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Dow Jones, and Sigma Delta Chi;258 
and the National Press Photographers Association.259 Even the venerable ACLU 
suggested that because reporters should only be required to testify to their 
knowledge concerning a planned, future crime of violence, "it may be preferable 
for the Court to adopt something approximating an absolute privilege, leaving to 
another day the carving out of possible exceptions.,,26o 
Whether one believes that the media representatives' advocacy of an absolute 
or qualified privilege was a reasonable proxy for their strategic cost-benefit 
analyses, or sincere expressions of their views of the law, it is clear that the press 
was a "house divided" on the desired scope of the testimonial privilege they 
sought. This failure to speak with one voice may have diluted the message being 
sent to the Court that such a privilege, whatever its scope, was commanded by the 
First Amendment. It would certainly have that effect in the legislative arena?61 In 
the end, Branzburg v. Hayes was a stunning defeat/62 with long-lasting 
implications for First Amendment doctrine. 
V. BRANZBURG AND THE LEGISLATIVE AFTERMATH 
A. The Branzburg Opinion 
Paul Pappas's reply brief before the Supreme Court quotes a then-new report 
by University of Michigan Law School Professor Vincent Blasi for a then-new 
organization called Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, which had been 
organized in response to the Caldwell case:263 
257 Brief of the Washington Post Co. and Newsweek, Inc., as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondent at 4, Caldwell, 402 U.S. 492 (No. 70-57). 
258 Brief of Am. Soc'y of Newspaper Editors et aI. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 24, Caldwell, 402 U.S. 492 (No. 70-57). 
259 Brief of the National Press Photographers Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 2, Caldwell, 
402 U.S. 492 (No. 70-57). 
260 Brief of the Am. Civil Liberties Union et aI., supra note 155, at 23. 
261 See infra Part V.B. 
262 Caldwell believes to this day that lukewarm support from The New York Times 
was responsible for the defeat. Caldwell Interview, supra note 11. He told the author that 
the late Fred Graham, then-Supreme Court and Justice Department reporter for the Times, 
had evidence that William Rehnquist had prejudged his case while at Justice and that 
appropriate pressure from the Times would' have forced Rehnquist to recuse' himself from 
the case. [d. 
263 McKay, supra note 228, at 108. As chronicled by McKay, a member of the 
organization's steering committee from 1976 to 1986, the RCFP grew out of a 1970 
meeting of thirty-five to forty reporters at Georgetown University who gathered 
specifically to discuss the Caldwell case. See id. at 108-09. Caldwell was seen as the most 
visible example of a dramatic increase in the use of subpoenas served on reporters in an 
effort to tap into the radical movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s. See id. at 111. In 
the aftermath of Branzburg, the RCFP played a major role in advocating for an absolute 
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Nothing, in the opinion of every reporter with whom I discussed the 
matter, would be more damaging to source relationships than a Supreme 
Court reversal of the Ninth Circuit's Caldwell holding. Several newsmen 
told me that initially they were extremely worried about the subpoena 
spate of two years ago, but that now their anxieties have greatly subsided 
as a result of the strong stand taken by the journalism profession and the 
tentative victories in court. However, a Supreme Court declaration that 
the first amendment is in no wise abridged by the practice of 
sUQPoenaing reporters would, these newsmen assert, set off a wave of 
anxiety among sources. The publicity and imprimatur that would 
accompany such a Court holding would, in the opinion of these reporters, 
create an atmosphere even more uncongenial to source relationships than 
that which occurred two years ago, when the constitutional question 
remained in doubt. 264 
1327 
Unfortunately, Blasi proved more prophetic than persuasive. With lip service 
to "some" First Amendment protection for newsgathering,265 Justice White 
proceeded to list all the First Amendment values that were not at issue in these 
three cases: 
[N]o intrusions upon speech or assembly, no prior restraint or restriction 
on what the press may publish, and no express or implied command that 
the press publish what it prefers to withhold. No exaction or tax for the 
privilege of publishing, and no penalty, civil or criminal, related to the 
content of published material . . . . No attempt is made to require the 
press to publish its sources of information or indiscriminately to disclose 
them on request. 
The sole issue before us is the obligation of reporters to respond to 
grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do and to answer questions 
relevant to an investigation into the commission of a crime.266 
Framing the issue thus told the entire story. 
Emphasizing that "'the publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity 
from the application of general laws, ",267 a theme he would return to in other 
newsgathering cases,268 White further minimized the protection accorded 
federal shield law, and, in the view of some, its no-compromise stance was a major reason 
why no federal legislation was ever enacted. See id. at 126. 
264 Reply Brief at 13, In re Pappas, 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (No. 70-94). Blasi's study is 
treated at length in Vince Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. 
L. REv. 229 (1972). 
265 See supra note 117. 
266 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681-82 (1972). 
267 Id. at 683 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937». 
268 See cases cited supra note 201. 
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newsgathering by undennining the "right to know" value on which it is predicated: 
"[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of 
special access to information not available to the public generally.,,269 Citing the 
absence of a reporter's privilege under either the common law or the "prevailing 
constitutional view,,,27o White noted that, while "[a] number of states" have 
provided a statutory privilege, "the majority have not done so, and none has been 
provided by federal statute.,,271 
On the records now before us, we perceive no basis for holding that the 
public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury 
proceedings is insufficient to override the consequential, but uncertain, 
burden on news gathering that is said to result from insisting that 
reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant questions put to them in 
the course of a valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial.272 
White gave particularly short shrift to Branzburg's claim of privilege. 
Insofar as any reporter in these cases undertook not to reveal or testify 
about the crime he witnessed, his claim of privilege under the First 
Amendment presents no substantial question. The crimes of news 
sources are no less reprehensible and threatening to the public interest 
when witnessed by a reporter than when they are not.273 
For the others, White said, "the evidence fails to demonstrate that there would be a 
significant constriction of the flow of news to the public if this Court reaffirms the 
prior common-law and constitutional rule regarding the testimonial obligations of 
newsmen. ,,274 
Even assuming some informants will refuse to talk to reporters, White 
continued, 
[W]e cannot accept the argument that the public interest in possible 
future news about crime from undisclosed, unverified sources must take 
precedence over the public interest in pursuing and prosecuting those 
crimes reported to the press by informants and in thus deterring the 
commission of such crimes in the future. 275 
269 408 U.S. at 684. 
270 Id. at 685-86. 
271 Id. at 689. 
272 Id. at 690-91. 
273 Id. at 692. 
274 Id. at 693. 
275 Id. at 695. 
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One by one, White rebutted and rejected each of the arguments raised by the 
reporters, returning finally to clarify the scope of First Amendment protection for 
news gathering. \ . 
[G]rand jury investigations if instituted or conducted other than in good 
faith, would pose wholly different issues for resolution under the First 
Amendment. Official harassment of the press undertaken not for the 
purposes of law enforcement but to disrupt a reporter's relationship with 
his news sources would have no justification.276 
That was the extent of the concession won by the press in Branzburg v. 
Hayes-far less than the Ninth Circuit opinion or even the original District Court's 
protective order. Even though numerous shield law bills have been introduced in 
Congress since Branzburg,277 enactment has always been considered a long shot, 
and all. First Amendment protections for newsgathering activities might well be 
stronger if Branzburg had never reached the United States Supreme Court. 
But if Branzburg was a strategic miscalculation, one cannot say that pursuit of 
a testimonial privilege for journalists was irrational or irresponsible. From the 
perspective of the key actors at the time, the odds favoring success were at least 
even, and important segments of the press saw prospective benefits of victory as 
greater than the downside costs. Perhaps the best thing to come out of the case was 
the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, which is today the premier 
legal information clearing house and litigator representing working journalists. 
B. The Legislative Fiasco 
According to Floyd McKay, principal chronicler of the Reporters 
Committee's early years, the Caldwell case was the precipitating factor in the 
formation of the committee in 1970.278 Thirty-five -to forty reporters attended a 
meeting at Georgetown University to discuss Caldwell and other cases.279 Led by 
J. Anthony Lukas and Fred Graham of The New York Times and Jack Nelson of the 
Los Angeles Times, the group took the name Reporters Committee for Freedom of 
the Press and created a steering committee of eleven colleagues.28o 
What distinguished the Reporters Committee from other media organizations 
that became involved in Caldwell and its companion cases was its insistence that 
working reporters, not editors or publishers, would call the shots.281 "Reporters 
needed their own advocacy group," James Doyle of the Washington Star told 
276 Id. at 707-08. 
277 See infra Part V.B. 
278 McKay, supra note 228, at 108. 
279 Id. at 109; see also Joe Holley, Obituary, Jack Landau; Founded Reporter Group, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 17,2008, at C7 (describing the fonnation of the RCFP). 
280 McKay, supra note 228, at 109. 
281 See id. 
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McKay in an intervit!w, "and we could not be sure publishers would do the job.,,282 
Indeed, the Times lawyers' initial reaction to the Caldwell case seemed indicative 
of a philosophical difference between working journalists and their managers, 
although the split over absolute versus qualified privilege had not yet broken down 
along those lines---:at least in the Supreme Court briefs.283 
Whatever the basis for that split, it was to prove fatal to enacting a statutory 
remedy for the Branzburg decision. By the time that decision was handed down in 
1972, the Reporters Committee was led by Jack Landau, a reporter-lawyer for 
Newhouse News Service who had returned to his Supreme Court beat after a brief 
stint in the Nixon Justice Department.284 Landau's aggressive advocacy for an 
absolute privilege in the years following the Branzburg decision, and his 
unwillingness to compromise with media organizitions willing to accept some 
qualifications, must bear a fair portion of the blame-or credit~for Congress's 
failure to enact a shield law in the early 1970s, when reaction to the Nixon 
administration's contempt for the press and Branzburg made such enactment most 
likely.285 
"[R ]eacting to what he called 'the recent wave of broad and sweeping 
subpoenas which. have issued from the Justice Department, '" Sen. Thomas H. 
McIntyre (D-N.H.) introduced the first testimonial privilege bill of the decade on 
March 5, 1970.286 Although McIntyre's bill died in committee, Sen. James Pearson 
(R-Kan.) introduced another shield bill, S. 1311, in the beginning of the 92nd 
Congress in January 1971.287 According to Sen. Sam Ervin (D-N.C.), the most 
authoritative reporter of this legislative process, the Pearson bill was "met with a 
less than urgent response," and the press adopted a "'wait and see' attitude" toward 
the bill pending resolution of the Caldwell case.288 
Ervin's Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights held hearings on the 
Pearson bill in September and October 1971.289 Months earlier, the White House 
282 Id. 
283 Although the new Reporters Committee was "emerging as the principal advocate 
of the 'no compromise' position on reporter confidentiality," McKay, supra note 228, at 
112, both the American Newspaper Publishers Association and the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors also urged an absolute privilege. See supra text accompanying notes 
255-258. Later, however, ANP A would split with the Reporters Committee to support 
compromise legislation. See infra note 302 and accompanying text. 
284 See McKay, supra note 228, at 112-13; supra text accompanying notes 228-230. 
285 Although a number of states had already enacted shield laws, see supra notes 
224-225 and accompanying text, similar bills had been introduced unsuccessfully in nearly 
every Congress since 1929. See VAN GERPEN, supra note 18, at 147-48. Popular support 
for a shield law had never been higher than immediately after the Branzburg decision was 
handed down. See McKay, supra note 228, at 115. 
286 Sam J. Ervin, Jr., In Pursuit of a Press Privilege, 11 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233, 251-
52 (1973-74) (citing S. 3552, 91st Congo (1970». 
287 Id. at 253 (citing S. 1311, 92d Congo (1971». 
288 Id. at 253-54. The government's certiorari petition in Caldwell was pending at the 
time. See supra text accompanying note 58. 
289 Id. at 254. 
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and Justice Department had begun taking a more conciliatory approach to the 
issuance of subpoenas against reporters,290 and Ervin recalls that "most press 
spokesmen who commented on the Pearson bill recommended that Congress 
proceed cautiously. Most urged that a statutory privilege be enacted only if the 
Supreme Court refused to recognize a constitutional privilege.,,291 Indeed, Ervin 
says, "the subpoena problem seemed to come last in the minds of most 
witnesses. ,,292 The bill went nowhere in 1971.293 
When the Branzburg decision came down in June 1972, Senator Alan 
Cranston (D-Cal.) immediately introduced legislation providing an absolute shield 
for journalists in both "federal and state proceedings.,,294 But the press was 
irreparably divided. The inactive Joint Media Committee was "revived for the 
purpose of drafting new legislation" embodying a qualified privilege.295 Their bill 
was introduced by Senator Walter Mondale (D-Minn.) on August 17296 and 
Representative Charles Whalen (R-Ohio) on September 5.297 Ervin introduced his 
own qualified privilege bill on August 16.298 No new hearings were held in the 
Senate, and although the House judiciary Committee held a series of hearings in 
late September, Congress adjourned without taking action.299 
290 In February, Attorney General John Mitchell issued a statement "regret[ting]" any 
misunderstanding arising from the issuance of subpoenas to the press and promising that, 
"in the future, no subpoenas will be issued to the press without a good faith attempt by the 
Department to reach a compromise acceptable to both parties." Ervin, supra note 286, at 
251 (citing N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 6, 1970, at 40). Mitchell's press spokesman at the time was 
Jack Landau. McKay, supra note 228, at 112. At a press conference in May, President 
Nixon said he took a "very jaundiced view" of subpoenaing the notes of reporters or taking 
action requiring reporters to reveal their sources. Ervin, supra note 286, at 254 (citing The 
President's News Conference, 7 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 703, 705 (May 1, 1971». 
Also, in May, Mitchell told an interviewer he had no objection "to legislation protecting" 
reporters' notes. [d. at 252. Finally, in August, Mitchell's Justice Department issued 
restrictive guidelines to U.S. attorneys regarding subpoenas for journalists. See supra notes 
226--228 and accompanying text. As noted therein, the guidelines were originally drafted 
by Landau. !d. 
291 Ervin, supra note 286, at 254--55. 
292 [d. at 255. 
293 See id. at 254--255. 
294 Ervin, supra note 286, at 255 (citing S. 3796, 92d Congo (1972». 
295 [d. at 256. Members included "the American Society of Newspaper Editors, the 
Associated Press Managing Editors Association, Sigma Delta Chi (the national journalism 
society), the National Press Photographers Association, and the Radio Television News 
Directors Association." [d. 
296 [d. (citing S. 3932, 92d Congo (1972». 
297 [d. (citing H.R. 16527, 92d Congo (1972». 
298 [d. (citing S. 3925, 92d Congo (1972». 
299 [d. (citing Hearings on Newsman's Privilege Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Congo (1972». 
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Ervin notes that "the public's attention was not really drawn" to the issue until 
two reporters were jailed in the fall of 1972 for refusing to reveal their sources.300 
"[T]he attitude of the press began to harden," Ervin says, and more groups began 
"urging an absolute" privilege.30l The American Newspaper Publishers 
Association, which supported an absolute privilege, spearheaded a new press 
alliance called the Ad Hoc Coordinating Committee, which tried to draft a bill 
acceptable to all factions. 302 The Joint Media Committee, finding that a qualified 
bill "no longer commanded a majority" of its members, issued a statement 
stressing the urgency oflegislative relief.303 
In November 1972, President Nixon told the American Society of Newspaper 
Editors that he did not think "federal legislation was warranted 'at this time, '" 
further inflaming the situation, and in December, another reporter briefly was 
jailed for failing to produce unpublished tapes of a confidential interview.304 When 
the 93rd Congress convened in January, eight bills and one joint resolution were 
introduced in the Senate, and fifty-six bills were introduced in the House.305 There 
was only one problem: "the great number of proposals demonstrated 
disagreement" among the legislators, and that, in tum, "only reflected the 
divergence in the press.,,306 The Ad Hoc Coordinating Committee, created to find 
common ground, produced six different bills, revealing differences not only in 
philosophy, but also in estimates of what kind of legislation could pass.307 Even 
Anthony Amsterdam complicated the picture by suggesting that a judicial hearing 
should be required before issuing a subpoena to reporters, an "interesting" concept, 
says Ervin, but one that "represented a new, complicated, and untested legal 
innovation, which reduced its political acceptability in Congress.,,308 
Ervin admits to being conflicted himself; he introduced his own qualified 
privilege bill at the beginning of a new round of hearings, and then found himself 
convinced by the Reporters Committee on Freedom of the Press that any effective 
legislation would have to cover the states as well as the federal government. 309 His 
new bill, however, contained an exception for testimony regarding crimes 
committed in the reporter's presence, which drew fire from both the Reporters 
300 /d. at 256-57. Ervin is referring to Peter Bridge of the Newark News and William 
FaIT of the Los Angeles Herald Examiner, who served twenty and forty-six days, 
respectively, for refusing to reveal confidential sources. Id. 
301 Id. at 258 (noting resolutions calling for enactment of an absolute privilege by the 
American Society of Newspaper Editors, Sigma Delta Chi, the Radio Television News 
Directors Association, and the American Newspaper Publishers Association). 
302 Id. 
303 /d. at 258-59. 
304 Id. 
305 Id. at 261. 
306 /d. 
307 /d. at 261-62. 
308 Id. at 263. 
309 Id. at 267-68. 
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Committee and the Joint Media Committee.310 Even after a dozen subpoenas were 
issued during the hearings to news organizations "in a libel action filed by the 
Committee to Re-Elect the President" (CREEP),311 the "fragmented press [could] 
not coalesce behind one approach" to legislation in either the Senate or the 
House.312 
"It did seem clear," Ervin said, "that unless the press groups themselves could 
achieve some unanimity on the issue, it was likely to fail without any effort from 
its opponents.,,313 And so it did. The Eighth314 and Second315 Circuit Courts of 
Appeals had both declined to force reporters to reveal their confidential sources, 
notwithstanding Branzburg.316 In March 1973, Judge Charles Richey granted a 
motion to quash ten subpoenas issued to news organizations by CREEP in the 
Watergate matter,317 and prosecutors around the country had begun to show some 
restraint.318 Ervin notes that Watergate itself demonstrated to some previous 
supporters that the press could do its job without a statutory privilege.319 Despite 
Representative Robert Kastenmeier's success in forging a compromise bill in his 
House Judiciary subcommittee, he could not get a majority of the media 
representatives to support it.320 The legislative effort crumbled. 
310 !d. at 270-71 & n.132. 
311 !d. at 269. 
312 [d. at 270. 
313 [d. 
314 Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986,992-93 (8th Cir. 1972) ("We are aware of 
the prior cases holding that the First Amendment does not grant to reporters a testimonial 
privilege to withhold news sources. But to routinely grant motions seeking compulsory 
disclosure of anonymous news sources without first inquiring into the substance of a libel 
allegation would utterly emasculate the fundamental principles that underlay the line of 
cases articulating the constitutional restrictions to be engrafted upon the enforcement of 
State libel laws. Such a course would also overlook the basic philosophy at the heart of the 
summary judgment doctrine.") (citations omitted). 
315 Baker v. F & F Inv. Co., 470 F.2d 778, 784-85 (2d Cir. 1972) ("Manifestly, the 
Court's concern with the integrity of the grand jury as an investigating arm of the criminal 
justice system distinguishes Branzburg from the case presently before us. If, as Mr. Justice 
Powell noted in that case, instances will arise in which First Amendment values outweigh 
the duty of a journalist to testifY even in the context of a criminal investigation, surely in 
civil cases, courts must recognize that the public interest in non-disclosure of journalists' 
confidential news sources will often be weightier than the private interest in compelled 
disclosure."). 
316 Ervin, supra note 286, at 272. 
317 See Democratic Nat'! Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394, 1399 (D.D.C. 1973); 
supra note 309 and accompanying text. 
318 Ervin, supra note 286, at 273. 
319 !d. at 274. 
320 !d. at 274-75. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article has examined Branzburg v. Hayes as part of a continuing· 
exploration into the mobilization of the press to shape First Amendment doctrine 
through strategic litigation. In ·Branzburg, the press failed, despite several 
favorable indicators, and that failure had grave implications for any First 
Amendment right to 'gather news. Although it is impossible to say conclu·sively 
why a Supreme Court decision goes this way or that, we can safely suggest that 
differences within the press, between Earl Caldwell and The New York Times, 
indeed, between reporters and their bosses generally,321 and between advocates of 
an absolute versus a qualified privilege, did not help the press make its case. The 
latter division proved to be even more significant when the issue moved to the 
legislative arena. 
The tragedy of Branzburg v. Hayes was the failure of the Court to adopt 
Anthony Amsterdam's argument that, for First Amendment purposes, the 
distinction between news gathering and publishing is an artificial one, advanced by 
the government to divide and conquer.322 The lesson of Branzburg v. Hayes and its 
aftermath is that a "house divided" is not likely to be effective in molding 
constitutional doctrine or winning a legislative privilege. 
321 McKay recounts a story told by Jack Landau about when Landau solicited 
Marshall Field, publisher of the Chicago Sun-Times, for fmancial support for the Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press. After Landau's pitch, Field replied, "Well, Mr. 
Landau, I'm not really very comfortable funding a group that calls itself the Reporters 
Committee." McKay, supra note 228, at 122-23. 
322 Brieffor Respondent at 48-49, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (No. 70-
57). 
